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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal presents two important, and potentially far 
reaching, public policy issues relating to (i) attorneys, (ii) the 
manner in which they practice law, and (iii) the protections to be 
afforded nonlitigants from being subjected to the unreasonable and 
unconstitutional seizure, and public disclosure, of their private 
and confidential business and financial records. 
First, and of utmost concern on this appeal, is a 
nonlitigantfs constitutional right of privacy in his or her private 
and confidential business and financial records, and necessity of 
being afforded an opportunity to protect that right of privacy. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that persons have a 
constitutional right of privacy in their bank statements, checks, 
loan applications, and all other papers and financial information 
supplied to their bank, see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 
418 (Utah 1991) (persons are constitutionally protected "against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements, 
checks, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers 
which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of 
[their] financial affairs upon a reasonable assumption that the 
information would remain confidential"). Appellants ask this Court 
to declare that persons who are not parties to a lawsuit have a 
constitutional right to receive, and that Utah R. Civ. P. 45(a) 
requires that such nonlitigants be given, notice of a litigant's 
attempts to subpoena confidential business and financial records 
: i 
from that nonlitigent's bank, so as to allow the nonlitigant an 
opportunity to object to the subpoena in order to protect his or 
her constitutional right of privacy. 
Second, and although not a constitutional issue, but perhaps 
equally as important in terms of the manner in which attorneys 
practice law in the state of Utah, Appellants ask this Court to 
declare that it is not permissible for an attorney to authorize 
nonlawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice law by signing 
pleadings, subpoenas, motions and other papers on behalf of the 
attorney, where Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically mandates that all such papers be signed by a licensed 
attorney. 
Finally, as a result of the conduct engaged in by Appellee's 
counsel (sometimes referred to as "Mr. Olsen") , Appellants request 
that the trial court's order denying an award of attorneys' fees 
and costs be reversed, and that the trial court be directed to make 
findings as to the amount of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses 
Appellants should be awarded as a result of Mr. Olsen's multiple 
violations of Rule 11 and Rule 45, Utah R. Civ. P.1 
The statement of facts in Appellee's brief contains a lengthy description of the acrimonious battle waged in the 
trial court between Appellee and the plaintiff Clifford E. Holt. Although perhaps interesting, such battle does not justify 
Appellee's trampling of Appellants' constitutional right of privacy, and is completely unrelated to the issues raised in 
this appeal. Accordingly, lfl| 3-4,6-23, and 88-90 contained in Appellee's statement of facts should be disregarded and 
stricken. Additionally, ^ 86 of Appellee's statement of facts does not cite to the record and should likewise be stricken. 
Appellants also note that Appellee gives a somewhat misleading chronology of those facts which are relevant. 
For example, in paragraphs 46 and 47, Appellee recites the fact that Appellant Terrance Frank was served with a 
subpoena on March 23, 1996, and that he failed to appear at the deposition scheduled for April 11,1996. Only later, in 
If 50, does Appellee mention that on or before April 1, 1996 (at least 10 days before April 11), Mr. Frank had filed a 
motion to quash the subpoena. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEE AND HER COUNSEL VIOLATED APPELLANTS1 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY BY SEIZING AND USING, 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO APPELLANTS, APPELLANTS1 CONFIDENTIAL 
BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RECORDS. 
It is black letter law that Appellants have a constitutional 
right of privacy in their bank statements, checks, loan 
applications, and all other papers and financial information 
supplied to their bank. See, e.g., Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418 
(persons are constitutionally protected "against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their bank statements, checks, bonds, loan 
applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which [they] supplied 
to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affairs 
upon a reasonable assumption that the information would remain 
confidential"). The trial court acknowledged the existence of this 
right of privacy when it ordered that the records produced by Bank 
One relating to Park City Pharmacy, Inc. (the "Pharmacy") be sealed 
(R. 730), and then stated that it was "going to honor [Appellants1] 
position." (R. 0732). 
Appellee herself also apparently concedes the existence of 
such a right of privacy, inasmuch as she does not contest this 
assertion in her opposition brief.2 Despite such concession, 
Appellee and her counsel offer three excuses as to why their 
violation of Appellants' right of privacy was allegedly justified. 
furthermore, in support of her own motion for protective order, Appellee herself argued to the trial court that 
a person has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her telephone records. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Protective Order [sic] (R. 0497-0499). 
3 
First, Appellee argues that as of the date that the subpoena 
to Bank One was prepared and served on Bank One, she and her 
counsel were unaware that Terrance Frank ("Mr. Frank") had any 
interest in the Pharmacy, and that they believed that Clifford E. 
Holt was the sole owner of the Pharmacy. Second, Appellee claims 
she provided notice to the Pharmacy by serving notice of Bank Onefs 
deposition on Evelyn Saunders, counsel for plaintiff Clifford E. 
Holt. Third, Appellee and her counsel argue they were justified in 
seizing and using Appellants1 confidential financial information 
because Appellants did not move to quash the Bank One subpoena. 
None of the three excuses offered by Appellee justify or alter 
the fact that Appellee and her counsel violated Appellants' 
constitutional right of privacy by seizing and using, without 
providing any notice to Appellants, Appellants1 confidential 
business and financial information.3 
A. The Notice Of Deposition Served On Plaintiff's 
Counsel Was Insufficient To Provide Notice To 
Appellants Of The Bank One Subpoena. The Pharmacy 
Had A Constitutional Right To Receive Prior Notice 
That Appellee Was Subpoenaing The Pharmacy's 
Confidential Bank Records. 
Appellants do not dispute the fact that Appellee's counsel 
provided notice of the Bank One subpoena to Evelyn Saunders, 
3Appellee also asserts, in footnote 1 of her brief, that Appellants failed to raise below the constitutional right of 
privacy issue with respect to the Bank One subpoena and are, therefore, barred from raising it on this appeal. It is 
difficult to understand how Appellee can, in good faith and within the confines of Rule 11, make such an argument. 
Appellants' counsel spoke at length about the Bank One subpoena during the May 16, 1996 hearing, and obtained an 
order from the trial court at that hearing that all of the Bank One records relating to the Pharmacy be sealed. (R. 0729-
0732). Additionally, in their Motion for Sanctions (the very motion at issue on this appeal), Appellants argued at length 
that the Bank One subpoena violated Appellants' constitutional right of privacy. (R. 0555-0559), specifically asserted 
that "Mr. Olsen's surreptitious subpoena to Park City Pharmacy, Inc.'s bank not only broke the rules of civil procedure 
but it also violated his constitutional right to privacy .. ." (R. 0559). 
4 
counsel for plaintiff. However, even Appellee must concede that 
Ms. Saunders represented only Appellee's ex-husband, and has never 
represented Mr. Frank or the Pharmacy. Notice to Ms. Saunders, as 
a matter of law, simply does not constitute notice to the 
Pharmacy.4 
To the extent Appellee asserts she had no obligation to notify 
the Pharmacy of her attempts to obtain the Pharmacy's confidential 
banking information, such a position is completely inconsistent 
with the constitutional right of privacy which the Utah Supreme 
Court has held exists with respect to such information. 
Accordingly, any interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P 45(a) which would 
not require notice to a person whose confidential bank records were 
the target of a subpoena would render the rule unconstitutional. 
It has long been a principle of statutory construction that the 
courts will seek to harmonize a statute with constitutional 
principles in order to avoid an interpretation which would render 
a rule or statute unconstitutional. See, e.g., Elks Lodges No. 719 
(Ogden) and No. 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control, 905 P. 2d 1189, 1202 (Utah 1995) (M[t]his court will 
construe a challenged statute to avoid constitutional infirmities 
wherever possible") . 
Here, the only way to interpret Rule 45(a) in a manner which 
is consistent with a person's constitutional right of privacy in 
It is uncontested that neither Mr. Frank, the Pharmacy, or their counsel were aware of the existence of the 
Bank One subpoena, or of Appellee's counsel's acquisition of the Pharmacy's confidential banking information, until 
after Appellee's counsel had already acquired and used the Pharmacy's confidential banking information in a deposition. 
(R. 0729-0730). 
5 
his or her confidential business and bank records is to interpret 
the rule in a manner which imposes an obligation on counsel to 
notify all parties, including any party affected by a subpoena, of 
efforts to obtain confidential bank records. Absent such notice, 
a person1s constitutional right of privacy in bank records would be 
effectively eviscerated. A nonlitigant whose bank records become 
the target of a subpoena would be left without any opportunity to 
protect his or her constitutional right of privacy, and would be 
subjected to the real risk that his or her confidential business 
and financial records would be publicly disseminated, as happened 
in this case when Appellee's counsel used the Pharmacy's 
confidential bank records in a deposition.5 
B. Appellee And Her Counsel Knew That Mr. Frank Had An 
Ownership Interest In The Pharmacy At The Time They 
Prepared And Served The Subpoena On Bank One. 
Appellee's assertion that she and her counsel had no knowledge 
that Mr. Frank was an owner of the Pharmacy, and that they believed 
Clifford E. Holt was the sole owner of the Pharmacy, at the time 
they prepared and served the subpoena on Bank One is simply false. 
On February 5, 1996, Mr. Olsen prepared a notice of records 
deposition, wherein Mr. Olsen asserted he was seeking from Mr. 
Frank the identical documents which later became at issue in the 
subpoenas served on Mr. Frank on March 23, 1996. On February 
5A nonlitigant's right to receive prior notice of a subpoena served on its bank can be particularly important in 
the commercial context, where the records being subpoenaed may include valuable trade secret information. For 
example, the bank records subpoenaed and obtained by Appellee included, without limitation, over 4,000 checks. Those 
documents would reveal both the identity of the Pharmacy's suppliers, and the prices charged by the suppliers. Thus, 
the bank records contain information which clearly constitutes valuable trade secrets, and which could be used to put the 
Pharmacy at a competitive disadvantage if it were to fall into the hands of the Pharmacy's competitors. 
6 
12,1996, Mr. Olsen then prepared, and subsequently made efforts to 
serve, a subpoena on Mr. Frank, which subpoena was virtually 
identical to the one which was served on Mr. Frank on March 23, 
1996. (See, e.g., Appellee^ Brief at 12, 55 32-32; R. 0611-0613, 
0616-0618). It was not until three weeks after having first 
prepared the notice of deposition, and after having been 
unsuccessful in their attempts to serve Mr. Frank with the February 
subpoena,6 that Appellee's counsel prepared the subpoena to Bank 
One. (R. 0349-0350). And it was not until March 11, 1996, after 
having apparently received a copy of the Affidavit of Terrance 
Frank, wherein Mr. Frank testified that he was sole owner of the 
Pharmacy,7 that Appellee served her subpoena on Bank One. 
Contrary to her representations to this Court, Appellee and 
her counsel clearly knew, at least as early as three weeks before 
the subpoena to Bank One was ever prepared, that Mr. Frank was an 
owner of the Pharmacy. Despite such knowledge, Appellee and her 
counsel never provided any notice of any kind to Mr. Frank or the 
Pharmacy of their efforts to obtain the Pharmacy's confidential 
financial information from Bank One.8 
Appellee had provided an incorrect address to the constable. (R. 0743). 
7Mr. Frank's affidavit was served, via mail, on March 7, 1996. (R. 0334). 
Furthermore, even after Appellants formally appeared in this case and filed their written objections to the 
subpoena served on Mr. Frank, Appellee's counsel still did not disclose to Appellants or their counsel the fact that he 
had already obtained the Pharmacy's confidential financial information. Nor did Mr. Olsen notify Appellants that he 
intended to use the Pharmacy's confidential information in a deposition, notwithstanding the fact that Appellants had 
filed a motion for protective order, objecting to Appellee's efforts obtain from Mr. Frank the very type of information 
Appellee was planning on using in the deposition. As set forth in more detail below, such conduct and willful 
nondisclosures, in addition to other misconduct engaged in by Appellee's counsel, warrant the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions. 
7 
C. The Pharmacy Could Not Move To Quash The Bank One 
Subpoena Because It Did Not Know About The 
Existence Of The Subpoena. 
Appellee's assertion that the Pharmacy's failure to move to 
quash the Bank One subpoena is simply a red herring. Appellee 
never notified the Pharmacy of the existence of the Bank One 
subpoena, and it is undisputed that the Pharmacy did not learn of 
the subpoena until after Appellee had already obtained the 
Pharmacy's confidential financial information from Bank One, and 
used them in a deposition. The Pharmacy simply could not move to 
quash a subpoena that it did not know existed. Furthermore, upon 
learning of the Bank One subpoena, Appellant's counsel obtained 
from the trial court an order that all of the Pharmacy's records 
obtained from Bank One be sealed, that the records be returned to 
Appellants, and that Appellee and her counsel were prohibited from 
maintaining any copies of such documents. (R. 0730, 0872-0873). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS1 
FEES WITHOUT EVER RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE UNDERLYING 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. 
A. The Trial Court Failed To Make Any Findings As To 
Whether Appellee's Counsel Violated Rule 45 And 
Rule 11. 
As a general rule, a trial court's failure to make findings on 
all material issues constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., 
Butler v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 255, 231-32 
(Utah 1995) . This is especially true with respect to an appellate 
court's review of a trial court's 0 determination, where the first 
step in the appellate review is a review of the trial court's 
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., 
8 
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992). Absent 
findings of fact by the trial court on a Rule 11 motion, the 
appellate court simply cannot perform the first step in its review 
of the trial court1s ruling. 
Here, the trial court failed to make any finding of facts with 
respect to Appellants' motion for sanctions. Consequently, it also 
failed to make any determination as to whether the conduct engaged 
in by Appellee's counsel violated Rule 11 or Rule 45 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such failure constitutes reversible 
error and, ordinarily, would require that this matter be remanded 
to allow the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law with respect to these issues. However, inasmuch as the 
facts in this case are clear and uncontroverted, and because it is 
purely a question of law as to whether Mr. Olsen's conduct 
constitutes a violation of Rule 11, See, e.g., Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court can and 
should make the legal determination that Mr. Olsen's conduct 
violated Rules 11 and 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
is particularly appropriate for this Court to reach these issues 
given the importance of the constitutional right of privacy at 
issue, and the importance of the issue of whether an attorney can 
delegate to his or her secretary or any other nonlawyer the 
attorney's Rule 11 obligation to sign subpoenas, notices of 
depositions, motions and other papers to be filed with the Court. 
9 
B. Mr. Olsen's Conduct Clearly Violated Utah R. Civ. 
P. 11 And 45. 
Rule 11 requires that *[e]very pleading, written motion, and 
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(a). Such requirement is imposed, at least 
in part, because in signing pleadings and other papers, the 
attorney is making certain representations to the court. See, 
e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). Thus, Rule 11 imposes certain duties 
on an attorney as an officer of the court, as opposed to the 
attorney's private duty to his or her client. Clark v. Booth, 821 
P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Similarly, Rule 45 imposes certain duties on attorneys which 
include, without limitation, an obligation to "take reasonable 
steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject 
to [a] subpoena." Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). Violation of this 
duty, as with violation of Rule 11, subjects the attorney to 
sanctions including, but not limited to, lost earnings and 
attorneys' fees. Id. 
Here, Mr. Olsen's conduct clearly violated Rule 11 and Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although addressed at length 
in Appellants' opening brief, Mr. Olsen's conduct is summarized 
below; 
1. Mr. Olsen authorized his secretary to sign at 
least 26 different subpoenas, notices of deposition, 
motions and other papers served on various parties and 
filed with the court below. These documents include the 
10 
subpoenas and notices of deposition served on Mr. Frank, 
(See, e.g., Addendum to the Brief of Appellants, Exhibit 
9); 
2. The subpoenas served on Mr. Frank, Bank One, 
and other third parties did not contain the notice to 
persons served with a subpoena, as mandated by Utah R. 
Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). (See, e.g., R. 0800-0802, 0304-
0307, 0402-0408); 
3. The subpoena duces tecum served on Mr. Frank on 
March 23, 1996, purported to require Mr. Frank to produce 
documents eight (8) days later on April 1, 1996 (R. 
0406), in violation of Rule 45(b)(4), and (c)(2)(A), 
which mandate that the witness be given at least fourteen 
(14) days to comply with the subpoena;9 
4* The subpoenas served on Mr. Frank on March 23, 
1996 not only purported to require Mr. Frank to produce 
his own personal documents, they also purported to 
required him to produce documents belonging to the 
Pharmacy, a legal entity completely separate and distinct 
from Mr. Frank. (R. 0402-0408).; 
5. Mr. Olsen served the Bank One subpoena, 
obtained the Pharmacy's confidential business and 
financial information from Bank One, and used that 
9To add to the confusion caused by the defective subpoena duces tecum, Appellee also served Mr. Frank with '< 
"subpoena" purporting to require Mr. Frank to appear and produce documents on April 11,1996. This second 
subpoena was also defective because it did not contain the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena, and 
because it sought to unconstitutionally invade Appellants' constitutional right to privacy. 
11 
confidential information in a deposition, all without 
ever providing notice to the Pharmacy, and while have 
actual knowledge that Mr. Frank claimed an ownership 
interest in the Pharmacy; 
6. Mr. Olsen used the Pharmacyfs confidential 
financial information in a deposition (1) after having 
received actual notice that the Pharmacy objected to any 
efforts by Appellee to obtain and use information similar 
or identical to the information Appellee obtained from 
Bank One and used in the deposition, (2) after 
Appellants1 had moved to quash the subpoena served on Mr. 
Frank, and (3) after the trial court had already ruled 
that the very type of information Appellee was seeking 
from Bank One with respect to the Pharmacy (i.e, 
confidential bank records) was confidential, was not 
discoverable and could not be obtained via a subpoena 
which Appellee had served on another non-party, Clifford 
L. Holt, father of the plaintiff. (See, e.g., R. 0309-
0312, 0398) ; and 
7. Mr. Olsen filed a frivolous motion for 
sanctions, asserting that Mr. Frank had disobeyed the 
subpoena by failing to appear and produce documents on 
April 11, 1996, when in fact Mr. Frank had already filed 
a motion to quash and was, therefore, relieved of any 
obligation to appear and produce documents, in accordance 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(C). 
12 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that, at least in the 
underlying litigation below, Mr. Olsen compounded rule violation 
upon rule violation, and engaged in a pattern and practice of 
violating Rule 11, Rule 45 and Appellants' constitutional right of 
privacy.10 Notwithstanding these violations, Mr. Olsen asserts his 
conduct should be excused because the subpoenas served on Mr. Frank 
were each issued by the Clerk of the Court after having been signed 
by Mr. Olsen1s secretary. Such argument ignores the fact that, in 
addition to those three subpoenas, Mr. Olsen's secretary signed at 
least 23 other notices of depositions, motions and other paper. It 
also ignores the fundamental requirement of Rule 11 that every 
pleading or other paper be signed by an attorney licensed to 
practice law. 
Mr. Olsen1s conduct in allowing his secretary to sign 
subpoenas and other papers filed with the Court is no different 
than if he had allowed a disbarred attorney to sign the documents 
at issue. Surely the courts would not countenance any lawyer's 
practice which allowed a disbarred attorney to sign papers on 
behalf of the licensed attorney. Similarly, this Court should not 
countenance Mr. Olsen's habit of allowing his secretary, who is not 
a lawyer, to sign subpoenas, notices, motions and other papers 
filed with the trial court. Rule 11 mandates that licensed 
Mr. Olsen's secretary's failure to include the requisite notice to persons served with a subpoena, the failure to 
allow Mr. Frank at least 14 days notice of the day he was required to produce documents, and the attempt to require Mr. 
Frank to produce corporate documents without serving the corporation are precisely the reasons Rule 11 requires 
licensed attorneys, who are presumably familiar with the Rules of Civil Procedure, to sign pleadings, subpoenas, 
motions and other papers. 
13 
attorneys sign documents such as those signed by Mr. Olsen's 
secretary. Mr. Olsen's conduct is a clear violation of Rule 11 and 
Rule 45, and this Court should make such a finding on this appeal. 
C. Appellants Have Not Waived Their Objections To The 
Defective Subpoenas. 
Appellee asserts that Appellants waived any objections to the 
defective subpoenas, by "stipulating] to what documentation and 
other material will be provided to [Appellee's] counsel." Brief of 
Appellee, at 41. In making this argument, Appellee misleadingly 
fails to provide this Court with the context necessary to determine 
whether the so-called stipulation in fact constitutes a waiver. At 
the May 16, 1996 hearing on Appellant's motion to quash, the trial 
court stated: 
I am asking counsel, as a courtesy to each 
other, and as an act of deference to the 
Court, to seal the records that are 
questionable in any way as having any bearing 
in this lawsuit. We will give [Appellants] 
the protective order. And I want the records 
surrendered to the Court, and they will be 
under seal. The Court believes that if the 
request is as it has been articulated, counsel 
[for Appellee] should be entitled to receive 
copies of any checks from the plaintiff's 
employer to the plaintiff in a relevant time 
frame. 
(R. 0733). In response to the trial court's request for deference, 
and the trial court's order that both Mr. Frank and the Pharmacy 
produce documents, even though the Pharmacy had never been properly 
subpoenaed, Appellants produced documents. Even then, however, the 
14 
documents were produced under the trial court's protective order.11 
Moreover, in producing these documents (according the trial court 
deference and abiding by its wishes), Appellants in no way waived 
any objections to the defective subpoenas, and the enormous 
consequent legal fees. Even after agreeing to produce documents at 
the May 16 hearing, counsel for Appellants continued to argue that 
the subpoenas were invalid and that sanctions should be imposed. 
In response to those arguments, the trial court ruled that it was 
"going to take the question of fees and costs under advisement . . 
(R. 0744). Appellants simply did not waive their objections to 
the defective subpoenas by complying with the trial court's request 
for deference, and by agreeing to produce documents which the trial 
court ordered be produced. 
D. The Trial Court's Failure To Make Any Findings With 
Respect To Its Basis For Refusing To Award 
Attorneys' Fees To Appellants Is Reversible Error. 
The trial court clearly erred by not providing any findings or 
basis for its refusal to award attorneys' fees in this matter. 
See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985) 
("attorney fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence and . . 
. findings of fact should be made which support the award") . 
As Appellee herself points out in her brief, the only finding 
made, or basis given, by the trial court with respect to the denial 
of fees was that the underlying divorce case "represented a very 
acrimonious, cantankerous, long, drawn out lawsuit, where there 
Appellee asserts on page 42 of her brief that Appellants failed to produce documents. Such alleged "fact" is 
not supported by any citation to the record, and thus must be stricken. 
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have been allegations and counter allegations of deceit and 
subterfuge and concealment and non-compliance and non-cooperation, 
ad nauseam." (R. 0874). Undoubtedly, the underlying divorce 
case was just as described by the trial court. However, the fact 
that the fight Plaintiff and Appellee chose to engage in was 
acrimonious and cantankerous in no way justifies Appellee's 
decision to trample upon Appellants' constitutional right of 
privacy. Nor does such fact constitute findings of fact which 
could provide any proper basis whatsoever for the trial court's 
denial of the costs and fees incurred by Appellants as a result of 
Appellee's, and her counsel's, violation of Rules 11 and 45, and 
their intentional and willful invasion of Appellants' 
constitutional right of privacy. 
It is Appellee's and her counsel's failure to comply with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and their intentional invasion of 
Appellants1 constitutional right of privacy, which caused 
Appellants to incur a substantial amount of attorneys' fees and 
costs. Accordingly, it is appropriate that Appellee and her 
counsel bear the burden of the costs and fees incurred as a result 
of their misconduct. This matter should be remanded to the trial 
court with directions that it make specific findings as to the 
amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and other sanctions which should 
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be imposed upon Appellee and her counsel as a result of their 
willful violations of Rule 11 and Rule 45, and their intentional 
and unconscionable violation of Appellants1 constitutional right of 
privacy.12 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants clearly had (and have) a constitutional right of 
privacy in their confidential banking records. Appellee and her 
counsel invaded that right of privacy by obtaining and publicly 
disseminating Appellants' confidential bank records. Appellee's 
counsel also violated Rule 11 and 45, Utah R. Civ. P., on multiple 
occasions. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Appellants' 
motion for sanctions should be reversed. This Court can and should 
make a determination that Appellee and her counsel violated Rules 
11 and 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and violated 
Appellants' constitutional right of privacy. This matter should 
then be remanded to the trial court with directions to make 
12Appellee cites Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978) as support for the proposition that the 
trial court's denial of attorneys' fees must be reviewed under a patent error or clear abuse of discretion standard. 
Appellee's interpretation of Beckstrom is, at best, a liberal reading of the case. In reality, however, unlike in this case, 
the trial court in Beckstrom made findings of fact, conclusions of law and determined that $500 in attorneys' fees should 
be awarded, as opposed to the $800 which had been sought. Under those circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that it would not disturb the trial court's findings absent "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Beckstrom, 578 
P.2dat523. 
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specific findings of fact as to the amount of attorneys' fees, 
costs and other sanctions which should be imposed as a result of 
such violations. 
DATED this . zv 4 day of August, 1997 
FOSTER & 
in G. 
'Brett 
At tor if 
| ter 
Jster 
.or Appellants 
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